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VIOLENCE, MINORS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: 
WHAT IS UNPROTECTED SPEECH AND WHAT SHOULD BE? 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech” 
-U.S. Constitution Amendment I 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Anyone who has been to the movies in the past twenty years or played a 
(non-educational) video game has no doubt encountered cars blowing up, 
shootings with morbid physical injuries, or scenes of women being abused.  
Sometimes these accounts of violence portray important historical events, like 
the Holocaust, civil rights protests, or a war battle.  Other times, the violence 
seems excessive and glorified for no reason other than the celebration of 
another’s pain.  In addition, anyone who has watched the news in the past five 
years has observed minors committing violent acts, whether as counterparts in 
sniper attacks, gang violence, or in school shootings.  Events like the 1999 
Columbine High School shootings brought these concerns to the forefront of 
people’s minds and awakened others to the dreadful implications of violence 
acted out by children.  Few would doubt that “juvenile violence is indeed a 
problem in the United States, and . . . American children are being exposed to 
violent entertainment at an alarming rate.”1 
Violence comes in many forms, including fighting, protesting, and threats.  
Most children encounter violence through the media, in video games, movies, 
internet, comic books, television, and music.  The increase in violent acts 
committed by minors and the desensitization of minors are often attributed to 
media violence.2  However, many social scientists believe that there are certain 
benefits that media violence provides children.3  These benefits include helping 
 
 1. Emily R. Caron, Blood, Guts & The First Amendment: Regulating Violence in the 
Entertainment Media, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 89, 91 (2001). 
 2. See James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 687 (6th Cir. 2002).  Social scientists 
continue to debate whether media violence does in fact have negative effects on minors.  See infra 
notes 3 and 4. 
 3. Many scholars also claim that “the belief that science has proved media violence to cause 
bad behavior is pervasive, persistent, and false.”  Marjorie Heins, Introduction to Brief Amici 
Curiae of Thirty-Three Media Scholars in St. Louis Video Games Case, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 419, 
420 (2002).  However, in this article I will assume that violence in the media does have at least 
some negative impact on youth.  When possible, I will note any counterarguments.  Scholars in 
opposition claim that the reason negative impacts are profusely associated with violence in the 
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children to encounter and deal with reality, “encourag[ing] the imaginary,” and 
helping children to “overcome their fears.”4  There are also several negative 
impacts that have been attributed to youth’s encounter with violence.  These 
include youth becoming desensitized, becoming “more accepting of real-life 
violence,” and becoming “more fearful and less trusting of their 
surroundings.”5 
In response to society’s concerns over violence, many advocate some type 
of restriction on the amount or type of violence available to minors.  One 
popular discussion has been to expand the First Amendment obscenity 
exception to include violence.6  Then, like obscene speech, violence could be 
regulated.  Traditionally, however, “expression portraying violence not directly 
connected with sex has been treated under the regular rules rather than the 
obscenity rules.”7  Notwithstanding, there is another alternative: treat violence, 
specifically with regard to minors, under the First Amendment similar to how 
child pornography is treated.  In other words, possibly create an exception to 
First Amendment speech protection for media violence with regard to minors.  
The concern over pornography and the push for regulation has often revolved 
around the fact that it “fosters violence against women and children.”8  
Arguably, the same could be said of much of the violence portrayed in the 
media and commercially geared towards minors.  The proposition of a new 
exception to the First Amendment would specifically craft any violence 
restrictions so that they were only applicable to minors.  Most agree that some 
response is necessary due to the increasing amount of violent entertainment 
children are exposed to and due to the alarming amount of violence being acted 
out by children.9 
This article will show there is a valid reason for concern over the effects of 
media violence on children, but it will also proceed to demonstrate why these 
reasons do not justify a new exception to the First Amendment.  “No matter 
 
media is because it is “much easier for politicians to launch attacks on the entertainment industry 
than for them to address the complex causes of social violence.”  Id. at 421. 
 4. Christopher E. Campbell, Murder Media—Does Media Incite Violence and Lose First 
Amendment Protection?, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 637, 665 (2000).  Other notable effects scholars 
claim violence has on children “can range from the catharsis of relieving anxiety and providing a 
safe outlet for aggression to actual changes in attitude, or imitative behavior.”  Heins, supra note 
3, at 420. 
 5. Children’s Defense Act, H.R. 2036, 106th Cong., § 5 (1999). 
 6. See generally KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, VIOLENCE AS OBSCENITY (1996).  Saunders 
advocates expanding the current definition of obscenity to include graphic violence.  Saunders 
drafted a statute based on that in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), entitled 
Disseminating Excessively Violent Material to Minors.  Id. at 189. 
 7. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 467 (1970). 
 8. DON R. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 433 (4th ed. 1987). 
 9. See James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 687 (6th Cir. 2002). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2005] VIOLENCE, MINORS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 245 
 
how compelling the academic evidence detailing the harm of [media violence], 
nothing justifies censorship.”10  An important question in this analysis is 
whether “the First Amendment [is] a convenient scapegoat for violence in our 
society.”11  It is imperative that a state not use “censorship as a tool to solve 
social problems.”12 
Although children’s exposure to violence is a valid issue, there are much 
stronger constitutional concerns to be considered.  Freedom of speech is well 
protected by the First Amendment and is a freedom dearly valued by 
Americans.  “Everyone has the right to free speech, but some speak on lonely 
street corners and others on televisions sets across the land.”13  The Supreme 
Court has made clear through its jurisprudence that “although the right[] of 
free speech . . . [is] fundamental, [it is] not in [its] nature absolute.”14  Rather, 
speech may be abridged in order to “protect the State from destruction or from 
serious injury, political, economic or moral.”15  However, speech that does not 
fit into one of the First Amendment exceptions is protected. 
In the last twenty years, several states and municipalities have attempted to 
restrict the amount of violent material accessible to children through the media.  
However, these attempts have, for the most part, been unsuccessful.  The 
appellate courts, which have found such legislation unconstitutional, stand on 
the fact that the regulations do not fall within any First Amendment exceptions 
that keep the speech from being protected.  Also, the content-based regulation 
of violent material available to children has thus far failed to meet strict 
constitutional scrutiny. 
Censorship of violent speech is not the best solution to alleviate the effects 
of media violence on children.  Instead of censorship of violent media speech, 
which would deteriorate the power of the First Amendment, there are several 
less restrictive alternatives available.  These alternatives include self-regulation 
by the entertainment industries, parental control and participation, and 
education programs.  One suggestion is that “parents and teachers can help 
children use television effectively.”16  This could include “viewing programs 
[at home] along with your children and talking about what they see on 
 
 10. David B. Kopel, Massaging the Medium: Analyzing and Responding to Media Violence 
Without Harming the First Amendment, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 20 (1995). 
 11. Campbell, supra note 4, at 662. 
 12. Jonathan Bloom, High Court Rejects Focus on Effects of Speech as Basis for Regulating 
Virtual Child Pornography, COMM. LAW., Fall 2002, at 21. 
 13. DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 216 (1998). 
 14. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 15. Id. 
 16. John P. Murray, Children and Television Violence, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 7, 12 
(1995). 
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television.”17  These alternatives are a better response to the problem, because 
they can work to actually resolve the underlying problems, rather than just 
hiding them with speech regulation.  By addressing the underlying social 
issues that cause children to become violent, society is benefited by an 
improved social welfare, while also keeping our right to freedom of speech 
intact. 
This article will examine whether the correct approach to concerns over the 
negative effects violence has on children through exposure to media violence is 
to create a new First Amendment exception.  This article will show that 
violence, with regard to minors, should continue to be protected by the First 
Amendment.  It will further show why violence is not entirely analogous to the 
child pornography exception.  There are several important reasons why the 
current problem of violence and minors should not be redressed through 
speech restrictions.  Section II of this article will review the historical role of 
the First Amendment and the types of speech the Supreme Court has carved 
out as exceptions to First Amendment protection, and will explore where 
media violence fits into these exceptions.  Section III will detail speech not 
protected by the First Amendment, specifically with regard to minors.  Next, 
Section IV will examine the harm caused by media violence and the overall 
failure of recent attempts to regulate violent material.  Lastly, Section V will 
analyze why media violence, with regard to minors, should not be crafted into 
a new First Amendment exception. 
II.  HISTORICAL FIRST AMENDMENT PERSPECTIVES 
The First Amendment’s freedom of speech clause exists to protect speech 
from restrictions by the government.  “The very purpose of the First 
Amendment was to prevent assigning liability to speakers for their 
expression.”18  However, there are limits to this right.  “The government is free 
to regulate conduct, as long as it is not related to the suppression of ideas.”19  
Throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, the Supreme Court has carved out 
several exceptions to the freedom of speech granted by the First Amendment.  
However, the Supreme Court, through subsequent cases, has made these 
unprotected types of speech very well defined and limited.  These exceptions 
are narrow in order to protect our liberties, regardless of how offensive the 
speech may be.20  “The protection given speech and press was fashioned to 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Caron, supra note 1, at 103. 
 19. Id. at 98. 
 20. The Supreme Court has stated: 
It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech and of the press 
which is secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute right to speak or 
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assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social changes desired by the people.”21  The Supreme Court’s speech cases 
have become more protective of speech over time, making it more difficult for 
the government to regulate speech. 
If speech is protected by the First Amendment, any attempt to restrict it 
must pass constitutional scrutiny.  Content-based restrictions on speech are 
subject to strict scrutiny. 22  Strict scrutiny requires a state to show that the law 
restricting speech serves a compelling state interest and that the law is 
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.23  Unprotected speech is the only 
type of speech which can be regulated based on content without meeting strict 
scrutiny. 
A. The Purpose of the First Amendment 
To begin our review of the First Amendment protection of speech, let us 
first examine what role the drafters of the First Amendment intended it to play.  
This review is not decisive.  However, it is helpful to better understand what 
role First Amendment protection should take.  “Some of the founding fathers 
of this nation viewed free and continual expression of ideas as essential to the 
successful functioning of a democracy.”24  The Bill of Rights, which includes 
the First Amendment, was adopted as a limitation on the government in order 
to gain support from Americans after the Revolution to “adopt[] . . . the U.S. 
Constitution and the national government it would establish.”25  The Framers 
of the Constitution believed that “government would be obliged to protect, not 
infringe upon, inherent individual liberties.”26  As Justice Cardozo noted, the 
freedom of thought and speech is “the indispensable condition, of nearly every 
other form of freedom.”27 
 
publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or an unrestricted and 
unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the 
punishment of those who abuse this freedom. 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 21. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). 
 22. Strict scrutiny is also discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 120-22.  Some 
Supreme Court Justices disagree altogether with any type of balancing test in determining what 
speech should be unprotected.  “I fear that the creation of ‘tests’ by which speech is left 
unprotected under certain circumstances is a standing invitation to abridge it.” Konigsberg v. 
State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 63 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 23. EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 274-76 (2001). 
 24. JOHN D. ZELEZNY, COMMUNICATIONS LAW: LIBERTIES, RESTRAINTS, AND THE 
MODERN MEDIA 33 (2d ed. 1997). 
 25. Id. at 35. 
 26. Id. at 34. 
 27. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937).  There are three “principal values” 
freedom of speech promotes.  They are “advancing knowledge and ‘truth’ in the ‘marketplace of 
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James Madison was the primary drafter of the First Amendment.28  Until a 
1925 Supreme Court case which expanded application of the First Amendment 
to the states, the Bill of Rights was believed to “prohibit[] only federal 
encroachments on individual liberty.”29  Today, “the First Amendment is read 
to prohibit all governmental bodies—local and state, as well as federal—from 
abridging free expression.”30  Speech has come to mean, through the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation, “all forms of expression, verbal or otherwise, that are 
designed to communicate ideas.”31  “This set of rights, which makes up our 
present-day concept of free expression, includes the right to form and hold 
beliefs and opinions on any subject, and to communicate ideas, opinions, and 
information through any medium—in speech, writing, music, art, or in other 
ways.”32  For each area of unprotected speech, “the Supreme Court has 
established a particular test, or definition.”33  In applying these definitions, the 
Court “assumes that liberty may be restricted only when necessary to 
effectuate legitimate interests of government.”34 
B. Exceptions to Speech Protected by the First Amendment 
Following is a brief analysis of some of the types of speech the Supreme 
Court has held to be unprotected by the First Amendment.35  Perhaps these 
 
ideas,’ facilitating representative democracy and self-government, and promoting individual 
autonomy, self-expression and self-fulfillment.”  KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 959 (14th ed. 2001). 
 28. ZELEZNY, supra note 24, at 35. 
 29. Id. at 36.  In dictum of the Gitlow opinion, the Court made the right to freedom of speech 
under the Constitution also relevant to the states.  Freedom of speech is “protected by the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”  See Gitlow v. New 
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 30. ZELEZNY, supra note 24, at 37. 
 31. Id. at 38.  Courts have found that paintings, books, and video games are all forms of 
speech.  There is a continuing debate over whether video games are speech at all.  A lower court 
judge remarked that “a video game, like a pinball game, a game of chess, or a game of baseball, is 
pure entertainment with no informational element,” and therefore not speech.  Interactive Digital 
Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County, 200 F.Supp. 2d 1126, 1133 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (quoting 
America’s Best Family Showplace Corp. v. City of N.Y., Dep’t of Buildings, 536 F.Supp. 170, 
173-74 (E.D. N.Y. 1982)), rev’d, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003).  The test whether something is an 
expression or simply action is “whether the action element in the conduct predominates; and 
whether the person is trying to tell something or do something, whether his conduct is 
representation or actuality.”  EMERSON, supra note 7, at 495. 
 32. EMERSON, supra note 7, at 3. 
 33. ZELEZNY, supra note 24, at 54. 
 34. DAVID S. BOGEN, BULWARK OF LIBERTY: THE COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 45 
(1984). 
 35. This analysis will not cover all unprotected speech.  For instance, it will not cover 
commercial speech and libel.  In addition, certain types of speech are considered low value 
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tests fashioned by the Supreme Court leave the answers to new fact scenarios 
unclear.  “The Court’s inability to develop a comprehensive theory of the First 
Amendment leaves it without satisfactory tools to deal with many new 
developments that are emerging in the system of freedom of expression.”36  
However, this overview highlights some of the important cases decided by the 
Supreme Court with regard to freedom of speech and examines how they affect 
a violence analysis. 
1. Incitement 
One type of speech that is not protected by the First Amendment is speech 
which incites imminent lawless activity.37  In Schenck v. United States, the 
Supreme Court articulated the clear and present danger test to determine if 
speech is protected.  The clear and present danger standard is met when “the 
words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create 
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils.”38  
For instance, Justice Holmes’ famous example is a person falsely shouting fire 
in a theater.39  In these circumstances, speech will not be protected by the First 
Amendment because of the perceived threat.  However, most types of media 
violence do not meet the “substantive evils” requirement.  Moreover, the 
Supreme Court has proceeded to reshape the incitement test through further 
cases. 
The Supreme Court’s modern interpretation of the incitement standard is 
found in Brandenburg v. Ohio.40  In Brandenburg, the Supreme Court held that 
to be unprotected speech, the speech must be “directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”41  In 
 
speech, and therefore afforded less protection.  This type of speech instills a balancing test.  See 
SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 27, at 967-68. 
 36. EMERSON, supra note 7, at 718. 
 37. It is important to note that many of the Supreme Court’s first speech cases were very 
restrictive on an individual’s right to free speech, especially with regard to political speech.  Most 
of these cases were concerned with advocacy to overthrow the government.  See, e.g., Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
 38. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).  Schenck was convicted under the 
Espionage Act of 1917 for distributing leaflets which the Court believed encouraged draft 
resistance.  The Court noted, in upholding the conviction, that the fact that the leaflets were 
distributed during a time when the country was at war was important in their decision.  Id. at 52-
53. 
 39. Id. at 52. 
 40. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 41. Id. at 447.  A Ku Klux Klan speaker was convicted of promoting violence in a speech he 
made at a rally where there was also a cross burning.  His speech included a statement against the 
United States government and minorities, saying “there might have to be some revengence 
taken.”  The Supreme Court reversed the conviction.  Id. at 446, 448. 
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Hess v. Indiana, a case dealing with statements made during anti-war protests, 
the Court found that because the language was “not directed to any person or 
group of persons, it cannot be said [to be] advocating . . . any action” and it did 
not have a “tendency to lead to violence.”42  The reasoning behind not 
protecting threats and harassment is that “[w]hat these crimes all have in 
common is speech—communicative acts—that are directed at one or more 
specific persons and are designed to inflict certain emotions, such as fear of 
physical injury or emotional distress, upon the victim(s).”43  However, there is 
more to this exception than just an infliction of strong emotions. 
In a more recent case, Virginia v. Black, the Supreme Court held that 
speech or an act is punishable when it is done with the intent to intimidate.44  
The Court continued, “‘True threats’ encompass those statements where the 
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of the intent to commit an 
act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”45  
Media violence does not express the intent of violence (a true threat) because 
usually no violence is being directly intended towards an individual or group 
of individuals. 
In Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. American 
Coalition of Life Activists, the Ninth Circuit held that when speech is a true 
threat, “where a reasonable person would foresee that the listener will believe 
he will be subjected to physical violence upon his person, [it] is unprotected by 
the First Amendment.”46  In its previous decision in this case, the appellate 
court noted that Brandenburg “held that the First Amendment protects speech 
that encourages others to commit violence, unless the speech is capable of 
‘producing imminent lawless action.’”47  Thus, “[i]f the First Amendment 
protects speech advocating violence, then it must also protect speech that does 
not advocate violence but still makes it more likely.”48  This directly limits any 
potential exception for media violence, unless the speech will result in 
“imminent lawless action.” 
Further, media violence cannot be included in this category because there 
is often no direct causal link between the time someone views or hears 
 
 42. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973). 
 43. Susan W. Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the Dissemination of Ideas and 
Data Be Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 273, 328 (2003). 
 44. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347, 361 (2003). 
 45. Id. at 359. 
 46. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life 
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 
F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990)), petition for cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003). 
 47. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life 
Activists, 244 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001), rehearing en banc, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 48. Id. 
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violence through the media and the time at which unlawful activity is 
undertaken.49  In several cases the courts have denied plaintiffs any recovery 
against media companies under the incitement exception.50 
2. Fighting Words 
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court noted that “the right 
of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”51  
Another type of speech not protected by the First Amendment is fighting 
words.  This exception covers what is often referred to as hate speech.  More 
specifically, face-to-face epithets which are intended to cause a violent reaction 
are not protected by the First Amendment.52  The words under this exception 
will tend “to incite an immediate assault.”53 
These hate words are not protected because they are “likely to cause a 
breach of the peace”;54 rather, these “utterances are no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that 
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality.”55  It is interesting to note that “since 
Chaplinsky, the Court has never upheld a conviction under the fighting words 
doctrine.”56 
Media violence is not considered to be fighting words because it is often 
done via an internet website, video game, or music lyrics and, therefore, not 
 
 49. In James, the court noted that “incitement is not imminent if it risks third-party violence 
at some ‘indefinite future time.’”  James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(citing McCoy v. Stewart, 282 F.3d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 2002)).  For instance, if a child from age 
five watches violence on television programs and movies, and then at age sixteen shoots his 
classmates at school, proof of causation becomes a major issue. 
 50. See, e.g., id; Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 480 F.Supp. 199, 206-07 (S.D. 
Fla. 1979) (finding claim against broadcasting companies for assertion that television violence 
caused child to murder women was unsupported under the First Amendment); Olivia N. v. 
National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888, 892 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (denying plaintiff 
recovery in claim that television film caused her assailants to sexually assault her because there 
was no evidence that the film advocated, encouraged, or incited the crime). 
 51. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).  In the Court’s decision it 
noted that certain types of speech are not deserving of First Amendment protection.  In 
Chaplinsky, a Jehovah’s Witness was proselytizing on the street.  He was convicted for offensive 
words he said against the city and city marshal: “You are a God damned racketeer . . . the whole 
government of Rochester are Fascists.”  The Court upheld the conviction because the words were 
“likely to provoke the average person to retaliation.”  Id. at 569, 574. 
 52. Caron, supra note 1, at 97. 
 53. FARBER, supra note 13, at 105 (emphasis added). 
 54. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.  Chaplinsky also laid a foundation for the obscenity 
exception.  Id. at 572. 
 55. Id. 
 56. FARBER, supra note 13, at 105. 
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face-to-face.  In addition, media violence is frequently not actual “fighting 
words.”  Rather, it is often simply a character on a screen, controlled by a 
child, who shoots other characters.  The violence is not usually directed at 
anyone in particular.  Also, the exception for fighting words requires a certain 
immediacy, which is not present with regard to media violence. 
3. Obscenity 
In Roth v. United States, the Supreme Court held that obscenity is not a 
form of speech protected by the First Amendment.57  In Miller v. California, 
the Court clarified the test for whether indecent speech will be protected.58  
The requirements for speech to be categorized as obscene, and therefore 
unprotected, are that it must appeal to the prurient interest; depict or describe, 
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct; and lack serious literary, artistic, 
political or scientific value.59  Accordingly, obscenity may be regulated.60 
An expansion of the obscenity exception was noted by the Court in F.C.C. 
v. Pacifica Foundation.61  “Even when material is not obscene, but meets some 
lesser standard of indecency, the fact that the material is broadcast on the over-
the-air media has been held to allow the federal government greater control.”62  
Thus, there are special regulations permitted for over-the-air media.  For 
instance, a federal criminal statute restricts obscene, indecent, or profane 
language on radio communications.63  However, it is important to note that 
even the definition of indecent in the statute is directed at sex.64 
Some scholars have proposed that the obscenity exception not be restricted 
to sex, but be expanded to include violence.  One reason for not expanding the 
obscenity exception to include violence is that obscenity focuses on an offense, 
while violence focuses on harm.65  Recent case law has demonstrated that 
courts are reluctant to extend the obscenity exception to include violence.66  
Violence is not within the narrow obscenity restriction on offensive sexual 
images. 
 
 57. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492-93 (1957). 
 58. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1968). 
 61. 438 U.S. 726, 746-48 (1978). 
 62. SAUNDERS, supra note 6, at 54. 
 63. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2004). 
 64. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 740 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1464). 
 65. For an analysis of why the obscenity exception should be expanded to include violence, 
see generally SAUNDERS, supra note 6. 
 66. See James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002); American Amusement 
Machine Ass’n. v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001); Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. 
Webster, 968 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1992). 
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However, it is debatable whether violence really is not offensive.  Many 
believe “[v]iolence is at least as obscene as sex,” if not more so. 67  Some 
people even find violence itself sexually stimulating.  Many people are 
offended by images of someone being attacked with a knife or of a bloody fist 
fight.  The debate over the definition of obscenity includes a discussion of the 
Supreme Court’s historical interpretation of obscenity.  Prior to the Civil War 
and the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, obscenity was defined as 
“whatever outrages decency and is injurious to public morals.” 68  Thus, 
obscenity could be interpreted to include sex and violence.  Currently, 
however, courts do not define obscenity to include violence. 
Clearly, media violence does not fit neatly into any current First 
Amendment exception.  Thus, if states wish to regulate violent speech without 
passing the strict scrutiny standard, a new exception would have to be created 
by the Supreme Court. 
III.  SPEECH WITH REGARD TO MINORS NOT PROTECTED BY THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: “HARMFUL TO MINORS” LAWS, INCLUDING THE CHILD 
PORNOGRAPHY EXCEPTION 
There are several laws specifically geared towards protecting children from 
harm, known as “harmful to minors” laws.  Examples include juvenile curfew 
and child pornography laws.69  In addition to the aforementioned exceptions to 
the freedom of speech, there is a special First Amendment exception that 
specifically aims to protect minors.  In Prince v. Massachusetts, the Supreme 
Court held for the first time that states have “a compelling interest in the 
protection of children from ‘harmful’ speech.”70  The Court created a special 
exception solely for minors because the “State’s authority over children’s 
activities is broader than over like actions of adults.”71  The Court stated that it 
is in “the interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, that children be 
both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and 
 
 67. SAUNDERS, supra note 6, at 3. 
 68. Id. at 104. 
 69. Courts in juvenile curfew ordinance cases “have found that protecting the community 
from crime, deterring juveniles from committing crime, and protecting juveniles from becoming 
victims of crime are all compelling governmental interests.”  Cheri L. Lichtensteiger Baden, 
When the Open Road Is Closed to Juveniles: The Constitutionality of Juvenile Curfew Laws and 
the Inconsistencies Among the Courts, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 831, 836 (2003); see also Bellotti v. 
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 625 (1979). 
 70. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 160 (1944). Prince was convicted for violation of 
a statute for permitting a minor to sell magazines in the streets.  Id.  See also Scott A. Pyle, Is 
Violence Really Just Fun and Games?: A Proposal for a Violent Video Game Ordinance That 
Passes Constitutional Muster, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 429, 445 (2002). 
 71. Prince, 321 U.S. at 168. 
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independent well-developed men and citizens.”72  Prince underlines the 
importance the Court places on the protection of children.  However, the Court 
also recognized the important role parents play in the upbringing of children, 
and that the State should not try to replace this role.73  The Court cautioned 
against handing the State too much power to restrict speech.  Justice Rutledge 
noted that it is “cardinal . . . that the custody, care and nurture of the child 
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include 
preparation for obligations the State can neither supply nor hinder.”74 
Child pornography is not protected by the First Amendment.  In Ginsberg 
v. New York, the Supreme Court held that “even where there is an invasion of 
protected freedoms ‘the power of the State to control the conduct of children 
reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults.’”75  Under Ginsberg, 
child pornography is unprotected speech and “the State is not required to 
provide ‘empirical’ evidence that exposure to sexually explicit materials may 
harm children, because legislators are permitted to assume such harm based on 
common cultural understandings.”76  This exception, therefore, makes the 
regulation of child pornography a much easier task. 
In New York v. Ferber, the Court held that “[t]he distribution of 
photographs and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles is intrinsically 
related to the sexual abuse of children.”77  Therefore, “[s]tates are entitled to 
greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of children” 
because it is “harmful to the physiological, emotional and mental health of the 
child.”78  The Court made clear that the exception for child pornography is 
separate from the obscenity standard set out in Miller.79  The reason is that the 
standard set forth in Miller “does not reflect the State’s particular and more 
compelling interest in prosecuting those who promote the sexual exploitation 
of children.”80  Ferber differs from the Miller requirements because it does not 
require prurient interest, patently offensive material, “and the material at issue 
need not be considered as a whole.”81 
 
 72. Id. at 165. 
 73. Many would agree that parents and family play the most important role in the upbringing 
of children.  See infra text accompanying notes 187-88. 
 74. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. 
 75. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
U.S. 158, 170 (1944)). 
 76. Ashutosh Bhagwat, What If I Want My Kids to Watch Pornography?: Protecting 
Children From “Indecent” Speech, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 671, 685 (2003). 
 77. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982). 
 78. Id. at 758. 
 79. Id. at 757, 764. 
 80. Id. at 761. 
 81. Id. at 764. 
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In Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Ferber, she reminds us that the 
overall goal should be to “protect minors . . . without attempting to restrict the 
expression of ideas.”82  In its decision, the Court emphasized that “whatever 
overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the 
fact situations.”83  The purpose of the exception carved out in Ferber was to 
“help prevent the abuse of children who are made to engage in sexual conduct 
for commercial purposes.”84  Specifically, the State’s interest in prohibiting 
child pornography is to protect children exploited by the production process.85  
In fact, Ferber “reaffirmed that where the speech is neither obscene nor the 
product of sexual abuse, it does not fall outside the protection of the First 
Amendment.”86  This has important consequences in frustrating any attempt to 
analogize violence with regard to minors.87 
The Supreme Court has held that child pornography is unprotected speech 
because “the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive 
interests.”88  Accordingly, in order to protect children from abuse, states are 
permitted to regulate the speech.  “States have a legitimate interest in 
prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene material when the mode of 
dissemination carries with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities 
of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles.”89  In addition, in Osborne 
v. Ohio, the Court noted that another reason for the child pornography 
exception is that “the materials produced by child pornographers permanently 
record the victim’s abuse.”90 
Recently, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Court granted First 
Amendment protection to virtual child pornography.91  The images at issue in 
the case, virtual pornography of minors, did “not involve, let alone harm, any 
children in the production process.”92  The important distinction made by the 
Court is that minors must actually be at risk of being harmed in the production 
of the pornography in order for the speech to be unprotected; “the creation of 
the speech is itself the crime of child abuse.”93  Using virtual minors certainly 
does not involve the use of real children, and therefore minors cannot be 
 
 82. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 775 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 83. Id. at 773-74 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-16 (1973)). 
 84. PEMBER, supra note 8, at 433. 
 85. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758.  See also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 249 
(2002). 
 86. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 251. 
 87. See infra Section IV for further discussion. 
 88. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763-64. 
 89. Id. at 754-55 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973)). 
 90. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990). 
 91. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 257. 
 92. Id. at 241. 
 93. Id. at 254. 
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harmed (i.e., sexually abused) in the production.  The Court observed that the 
“prospect of crime, however, by itself does not justify laws suppressing 
protected speech.”94  This reiterated that “speech may not be prohibited 
because it concerns subjects offending our sensibilities.”95  Notably, this case 
restricts the child pornography exception to a very narrow class.  More relevant 
to our analysis here, the Court notes that the “objective of shielding children 
does not suffice to support a blanket ban if the protection can be accomplished 
by a less restrictive alternative.”96 
 
 94. Id. at 245. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 252 (quoting United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 
U.S. 803, 814 (2000)). 
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IV.  THE FAILURE OF RECENT VIOLENCE STATUTES AND THE HARM THEY 
INTENDED TO ADDRESS 
Reflecting on the fear of too much restriction of speech, one author asks 
the question, “Should our society be comfortable with an increased censorship 
of ideas just because some sociopaths read the same books and watch the same 
movies as we do?”97  To begin with, “the Supreme Court has never held that 
speech containing violent sentiments or imagery lies outside the protection of 
the First Amendment as applied to either adults or children.”98  In one of the 
few Supreme Court cases addressing media violence and the First Amendment, 
Winters v. New York, the Court struck down a statute prohibiting the 
distribution of magazines containing criminal news and stories of bloodshed 
because they were believed to be “vehicles for inciting violent and depraved 
crimes against the person.”99  The Court noted that although they could not see 
“any possible value to society in these magazines, they are as much entitled to 
the protection of free speech as the best of literature.”100  However, this has not 
acted as the end-all to the question of whether violence is protected by the First 
Amendment, especially with regard to minors.  The process may seem 
frustrating because the Supreme Court “sometimes seems determined to test 
our commitment to free expression by finding the most unpleasant possible 
conduct to protect.”101  However, there are important reasons for allowing such 
a broad protection of speech. 
A. Proposed Federal Legislation and Documentation of the Harms Caused 
by Media Violence 
Few doubt that the violence children encounter through the media has at 
least some impact on them.  Concerns over the effects of violence on minors 
are nothing new.  Congress has been discussing these concerns for close to 
fifty years.102  More recently, Congressional bills have been introduced 
 
 97. Campbell, supra note 4, at 638.  Another author notes, “Putting aside the First 
Amendment, it is unjust to censor entertainment for a huge majority of Americans because a 
small fraction of the population reacts inappropriately.”  Kopel, supra note 10, at 20. 
 98. Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes: Examining the State’s Interest in Protecting Children 
from Controversial Speech, 53 VAND. L. REV. 427, 456 (2000).  See generally Winters v. New 
York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 
1992). 
 99. Winters, 333 U.S. at 518. 
 100. Id. at 510. The Court also noted, “What is one man’s amusement, teaches another’s 
doctrine.”  Id. 
 101. FARBER, supra note 13, at 2.  For instance, the Court has protected the burning of the 
American flag and cross burning.  See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 102. SAUNDERS, supra note 6, at 15. 
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responding to the problem of minors’ exposure to violence.  If the fact that this 
speech is clearly protected is so obvious, one may wonder why attempt after 
attempt has been made to restrict it.  The answer may be that the protection of 
this type of speech may not be as certain as one thinks. 
In 1999, a bill was introduced to the House of Representatives which 
focused on the harmful effects of violent material on children’s development 
and would regulate minors’ access to violent material.103  The bill noted in its 
findings that “children between the ages of 2 and 11 years spend an average of 
21 hours in front of a television each week,”104 and “64 percent of teenagers 
played video or personal computer games on a regular basis . . . [and that 
among] children as young as elementary school age . . . almost half of them list 
violent computer games among their favorites.”105  Death and violence are 
often “glamorized” in entertainment.106  The bill stated that research has found 
“a strong correlation between the exposure of children to televised violence 
and a number of behavioral and psychological problems.”107  The bill 
emphasized that concerns over violence are not unfounded, because “children 
who are consistently exposed to violence on television have a higher tendency 
to exhibit violent and aggressive behavior, both as children and later in life.”108 
In a 2000 Congressional Report prepared by the Federal Trade 
Commission, Marketing Violent Entertainment to Children, it was noted that 
although the motion picture, music recording, and electronic games industries 
all have their own self-regulatory systems, there are still concerns to be 
addressed.  Specifically, the “individual companies in each industry routinely 
market to children the very products that have industries’ self-imposed parental 
warnings or ratings with age restrictions due to violence conduct.”109  The 
effects of the violence portrayed in these industries include “aggressive 
attitudes and behavior in children.”110  This is evidence of the concern over the 
failure of self-regulation systems, and casts doubt over whether this solution 
will address the problems of minor’s overexposure to violence in the media.  
The report’s conclusion stated that the Federal Trade Commission could “do a 
 
 103. Children’s Defense Act of 1999, H.R. 2036, 106th Cong. (1999). 
 104. Id. § 5(a)(2). 
 105. Id. § 5(a)(20). 
 106. Id. § 5(a)(21). 
 107. Id. § 5(a)(4).  As previously noted, many social scientists challenge this theory.  See 
supra notes 3-4. 
 108. H.R. 2036 § 5(a)(5). 
 109. Robert Pitofsky, Marketing Violent Entertainment to Children: A Review of Self-
Regulation and Industry Practices in the Motion Picture, Music Recoding, and Electronic Game 
Industries, Prepared Statement Before the United States Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation (Sept. 13, 2000) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/ 
09/violencerpttest.htm). 
 110. Id. 
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better job of helping parents choose appropriate entertainment for their 
children by providing clear and conspicuous notification of violence 
content.”111 
The good news is that, in subsequent follow up reports, the Federal Trade 
Commission found that there has been improvement in the areas of media self-
regulation.  They found “progress by the movie and electronic game industries 
in complying with and improving their own self-regulatory policies restricting 
ad placements and requiring rating information in advertising.”112  
Interestingly, the Federal Trade Commission reiterated its “support [of] private 
sector initiatives by industry and individual companies to implement” needed 
changes, rather than a recommendation of legislation with potential First 
Amendment conflicts.113 
In 2003, a bi-partisan bill was introduced before the United States Senate 
entitled Children’s Protection from Violent Programming Act.114  The bill is 
still in committee.  The bill would authorize the FCC “to prohibit the 
distribution of violent video programming during the hours when children are 
reasonably likely to comprise a substantial portion of the audience.”115  
Clearly, this bill, if passed, would encounter First Amendment challenges.116  
This is another example of federal legislation trying to remedy the concerns 
over media violence and children. 
A recent Wall Street Journal article reported that video games are 
becoming “more violent, racy and realistic.”117  One reason for this is that 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Lee Peeler, Marketing Violent Entertainment to Children: Self-Regulation and Industry 
Practices in the Motion Picture, Music Recording, and Electronic Game Industries, Prepared 
Statement Before the United States House of Representatives Subcommittee on 
Telecommunications and the Internet of the Committee on Energy and Commerce (Oct. 1, 2002) 
(transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/10/marketing021001.htm) [hereinafter Peeler 
Statement].  The July 8, 2004 update noted continued progress.  See Report to Congress from the 
Federal Trade Commission, Marketing Violent Entertainment to Children: A Fourth Follow Up 
Review of Industry Practices in the Motion Picture, Music Recoding and Electronic Game 
Industries (July 8, 2004) (available at www.ftc.gov/os/2004/07/040708kidsviolencerpt.pdf).  The 
FTC has also created a new website on entertainment ratings, which is available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/misc/rateguide.htm. 
 113. Peeler Statement, supra note 112. 
 114. S. 161, 108th Cong. (2003).  There is also a related House bill, H.R. 3914, 108th Cong. 
(2003), also in committee as of March 2004.  Also, House Bill H.R. 669, 108th Cong. (2003) 
would prohibit the sale and rental of adult video games to minors.  This bill is also in committee.  
It appears these bills, as do most bills, did not make it beyond committee. 
 115. S. 161, § 3(b). 
 116. Leniency is permitted when the speech is over-the-air.  See supra text accompanying 
notes 61-64. 
 117. Joseph Pereira, Games Get More Explicit—And So Do Warning Labels, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 25, 2003, at D1. 
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“game creators are often finding that . . . violence sells.”118  An example 
highlighted in the article was the popular video game Grand Theft Auto: Vice 
City where “players roam a city, delivering cocaine to crime bosses and 
seeking favors from prostitutes.”119 
All of these proposals and reports suggest the negative impact media 
violence can have on children.  However, we are still left asking what the best 
remedy to this problem is.  First Amendment restrictions are not the answer. 
B. Recent Violence Statutes Fail 
In the past few years, several jurisdictions have attempted to pass 
legislation restricting minors’ access to violent media material.  However, 
those attempts have proved unfruitful.  Legislation restricting minors’ access to 
violent media is usually content-based because it restricts a type of speech 
(violence), rather than a time or place in which the material is prohibited.  As 
previously discussed, because there is currently no First Amendment exception 
for violence, in order to overcome a challenge to a content-based restriction on 
protected speech, a statute must pass strict scrutiny.  To pass strict scrutiny, a 
state must demonstrate that it has a compelling interest in regulating the speech 
and that the regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve that end interest.  A state 
“must do more than allege that a harm exists.” 120  A state must “show a nexus 
between the speech and the harm indicating that the regulation will alleviate 
the harm ‘in a direct and material way.’”121  However, when a restriction is 
limited to minors, the standard is somewhat relaxed.  The Supreme Court has 
required that “such regulations be narrowly tailored to protecting minors from 
speech that may improperly influence them and not effect an ‘unnecessarily 
broad suppression of speech’ appropriate for adults.”122 
As previously discussed, violence has not been included as part of the 
obscenity exception.  For example, the Eighth Circuit noted in Video Software 
Dealers Association v. Webster that “[m]aterial that contains violence but not 
depictions or descriptions of sexual conduct cannot be obscene . . . . [V]ideos 
depicting only violence do not fall within the legal definition of obscenity for 
either minors or adults.”123  This has been the greatest obstacle to attempts by 
 
 118. Id. at D8. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Ross, supra note 98, at 501. 
 121. Id. 
 122. James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 696 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Reno v. ACLU, 
521 U.S. 844, 874-75 (1997) and United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 
812-13 (2000)). 
 123. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1992).  In this 
case, a Missouri statute was found unconstitutional which prohibited making available, renting, or 
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states to restrict minor’s access to violence.  “Speech that is neither obscene as 
to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be 
suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative 
body thinks unsuitable for them.”124 
In American Amusement Machine Association v. Kendrick, the Seventh 
Circuit found unconstitutional an Indianapolis ordinance limiting minors’ 
access to video games depicting violence.125  Again it was held that “[v]iolence 
and obscenity are distinct categories of objectionable depiction.”126  Violence 
is a “different concern from that which animates the obscenity laws.”127  
Obscenity regulation is concerned with material that is offensive,128  whereas 
violence regulation is concerned with material that may prove to be harmful.129  
As a note to the importance of children’s exposure to these different forms of 
media, the court observed that “[p]eople are unlikely to become well-
functioning, independent-minded adults and responsible citizens if they are 
raised in an intellectual bubble.”130  Because the violence prohibited in the 
Indianapolis ordinance did not fall within any exception to First Amendment 
protection, it was found unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court has held that the “mere tendency of speech to 
encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning it.”131  Nor can 
the government prohibit speech “because it increases the chance an unlawful 
act will be committed ‘at some indefinite future time.’”132  In addition, for 
those who have sought tort liability for the effects of media violence, 
“evidentiary weaknesses help to explain the fact that no court has ever found 
civil liability for violence based on the influence of controversial speech.”133 
Legislation has also encountered the problem of overbreadth created by 
restricting adults in an attempt to restrict minors.  In Butler v. Michigan, the 
Court struck down a statute because it was “not reasonably restricted to the evil 
with which it is said to deal.”134  The “invalidated . . .  statute prohibit[ed] [the] 
distribution of an indecent publication because of its tendency to ‘incite minors 
 
selling violent videos to minors.  The Eighth Circuit found that the statute did not pass strict 
scrutiny.  Id. at 689. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 579 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 126. Id. at 574. 
 127. Id. at 575. 
 128. Id. at 574. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass’n, 244 F.3d at 577. 
 131. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002). 
 132. Id. (quoting Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973)). 
 133. Ross, supra note 98, at 506. 
 134. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). 
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to violent or depraved or immoral acts.’”135  The legislation was found to be 
“quarantining the general reading public against books not too rugged for 
grown men and women in order to shield juvenile innocence.”136 
In James v. Meow Media, Inc., violence again failed to be found as an 
exception to freedom of speech.137  The Sixth Circuit did note that “certain 
speech, while fully protected when directed to adults, may be restricted when 
directed towards minors.”138  However, the court denied tort liability and 
refused to extend obscenity jurisprudence to include violent material.139  The 
court made sure to “confine the scope of obscene material to works which 
depict or describe sexual conduct.”140  In addition, the court noted that a 
violence restriction also fails under the Bradenburg incitement test because the 
“mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason 
for banning it absent some showing of a direct connection between the speech 
and imminent illegal conduct.”141 
Recently, in Interactive Digital Software Association v. St. Louis County, 
the Eighth Circuit invalidated an ordinance which made it unlawful to sell, 
provide, or rent graphically violent video games to minors.142  The court found 
that the ordinance was not constitutional because it violated the First 
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech and did not pass the strict 
scrutiny standard.143  The court directed that “the County must come forward 
with empirical support for its belief that ‘violent’ video games cause 
psychological harm to minors” in order to pass strict scrutiny.144 
However, in Rothner v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit upheld a City 
of Chicago ordinance prohibiting minors from playing (any) video games 
during school hours.145  The ordinance was a time, place and manner 
 
 135. Ashcroft, 353 U.S. at 252. 
 136. Butler, 352 U.S. at 383. 
 137. 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002).  In James, parents of victims of a shooting at a Kentucky 
high school sued companies under tort claims for violent products they claimed caused the 
gunmen’s actions.  Id. at 687.  The court held that the companies did not owe a duty of care to the 
victims.  Id. at 699. 
 138. Id. at 696. However, even these “regulations [must] be narrowly tailored to protecting 
minors from speech that may improperly influence them and not effect an ‘unnecessarily broad 
suppression of speech’ appropriate for adults.”  Id. 
 139. Id. at 698. 
 140. Id. at 697. 
 141. Id. at 698 (quoting Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 236 (2002)). 
 142. Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 
2003).  In many ways, Interactive Digital Software Ass’n was a repeat of Video Software Dealers 
Ass’n, discussed in supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text, with video games being at issue 
instead of movies. 
 143. Interactive Digital Software Ass’n, 329 F.3d at 956, 958. 
 144. Id. at 959. 
 145. Rothner v. City of Chicago, 929 F.2d 297, 298 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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restriction, and applied to all video games “irrespective of any message, theme 
or plot.”146  Therefore, it was not subject to a strict scrutiny test, and was 
constitutional. 
A lawsuit has recently been filed in Florida against the maker and 
distributors of the video game Grand Theft Auto: Vice City.147  The plaintiffs 
want the game to be banned or its sale restricted because they assert the game 
advocates and causes violence against Haitians.148  Specifically, the groups 
“claim that the violence in [the] video games causes psychological harm to 
children and directly causes some of them to commit violence.”149  Based on 
case precedent, this attempt to restrict the video game for its violent conduct 
will not succeed because it will be classified as protected speech under the 
First Amendment unless it can meet the requirements of strict scrutiny, 
regardless of the fact that the violence is directed at a particular group of 
persons. 
One interesting note is a Colorado statute that has remained unchallenged 
which prohibits videos from being sold or rented to minors which 
“predominantly appeal[] to the interest in violence.”150  If challenged, the issue 
would be whether the statute meets strict scrutiny because it is a content-based 
restriction.151  Unless the Supreme Court creates a new exception for violence, 
this type of legislation would be held unconstitutional. 
 
 146. Id. at 303.  Content-neutral regulations on speech can be more easily imposed: 
The government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place or manner of 
protected speech, provided the restrictions are “justified without reference to the content 
of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government 
interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the 
information.” 
Id. 
 147. Gary Young, Suit Takes Aim at Video Game: Haitian-American Groups Decry Content 
in the Latest of Several Suits, 26 NAT’L L.J. 4 (Jan. 12, 2004). 
 148. The game includes the phrase “kill the Haitians” and has its characters involved in 
“ethnic gang warfare.”  Id. 
 149. There is an increased fear of the negative effect video games have on children.  “[S]ocial 
science research indicates that the games are more damaging than less interactive media, such as 
violent movies.  They may also make violent children more efficient killers by teaching the 
military-style tactics that were on display in the Columbine High School massacre and other 
school assaults.”  Id.  However, the president of Entertainment Software Association claimed that 
“[p]eople who commit crimes and blame video games are simply making excuses to duck 
responsibility to avoid paying for their illegal acts.”  Id. 
 150. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-601 (2004). 
 151. I cannot see any reason why this statute would not be challenged and found 
unconstitutional based on current First Amendment case precedent.  See, e.g., Interactive Digital 
Software Ass’n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003); American Amusement 
Machine Ass’n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001); Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. 
Webster, 968 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1992). 
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V.  NO VALIDATION FOR CREATION OF A SPECIAL EXCEPTION FOR MEDIA 
VIOLENCE AND MINORS 
Currently, “[i]ndecent material is protected by the First Amendment unless 
it constitutes obscenity or child pornography.”152  However, if media violence 
with regard to minors is analogous to child pornography, perhaps it too should 
be made into an exception.  Thus, we must explore how far the analogy 
between child pornography and minors’ exposure to media violence should be 
extended.  Undoubtedly, the “contemporary free speech doctrine definitely 
rejects offense and hurt feelings as a legitimate ground for suppressing public 
discourse.”153  The child pornography exception to First Amendment 
protection focuses on the harm done to children when they are used in the 
making of the pornographic speech.  However, minors who are exposed to and 
used in the making of violent movies and other forms of media entertainment 
are also exposed to harm. 
A century ago sexual content was not tolerated and was tightly controlled 
due to concerns of the negative impact it would have on minors.  But today, 
arguably, there is much greater tolerance of sex.  Instead, violence is much less 
tolerated and is a major concern.  Modern society’s values are changing, and 
have changed, since the obscenity exception was articulated by the Supreme 
Court.  Today, society has significant concerns over the impact of violence on 
today’s youth.  Some examples of the attempts by society to regulate violence 
are zero-tolerance school policies, increasing pressures to reduce violence in 
the movie industry, and the establishment of metal detectors at schools and 
libraries for safety.154 
An important distinction between sex and violence is the “difference 
between peer pressure to participate in either sex or violence and the 
possibility of becoming a victim of violence.” 155  The main concerns over 
involvement in sex are typically pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases, 
not becoming a victim of a violent crime.156  This is one reason why it is 
difficult to make a clear comparison of violence with regard to minors and 
child pornography. 
Furthermore, violence itself has become an actual form of entertainment 
for youth.  Minors are detached from the distinction between reality and 
 
 152. HENRY COHEN, OBSCENITY, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND INDECENCY 5 (Mathew D. 
Clark ed., 2002). 
 153. JAMES WEINSTEIN, HATE SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE RADICAL ATTACK ON 
FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE 128 (1999). 
 154. For a discussion on the negative effects censorship has on schools, see Robert D. 
Richards & Clay Calvert, Columbine Fallout: The Long-Term Effects on Free Expression Take 
Hold in Public Schools, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1089 (2003). 
 155. SAUNDERS, supra note 6, at 27. 
 156. Rape is excluded because it is an act of violence, not sex. 
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fiction, and often the harm that violence causes actually becomes the 
entertainment.  This is because “children often do not perceive distinctions 
between fantasy and reality in media presentations.”157  Perhaps regulating 
violent speech aimed at minors would, in turn, keep with society’s changing 
values.  Nevertheless, the First Amendment is not a ship riding the currents of 
society’s trends.  While our Constitution is an adaptable, living Constitution, it 
is also a firm foundation for liberty of the freedom of thought and 
expression.158  “The First Amendment, like the other guarantees in the Bill of 
Rights, is not subject to revision on the basis of cost/benefit calculations.”159  
An exception to First Amendment protection is not justified for violence.  
Instead, “[c]ontrols over such matters will have to remain, as they undoubtedly 
should, with parents, schools, churches and similar institutions.”160 
One real obstacle to creating a new exception to the First Amendment is 
that “[c]ontroversial speech about violence merely portrays violent acts or 
characters but does not expressly advocate imminent violence.”161  The 
concern over child pornography is in the creation of the medium, not the 
viewing of the medium.  This is evident in the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Free Speech Coalition.162  With violence, the real concern is the viewing and 
participation of the medium, not the creation of it.  Some similarities can be 
found between the harms involved with child pornography and minors’ 
exposure to media violence.  However, denying violence First Amendment 
protection will seriously hinder the First Amendment’s underlying purpose, 
and censorship of violence with regard to minors is the wrong avenue for 
resolution of the concerns.163 
The Supreme Court has previously been willing to create new First 
Amendment exceptions.  “When a definable class of material . . . bears so 
heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in its production, 
we think the balance of competing interests is clearly struck and that it is 
permissible to consider these materials as without the protection of the First 
 
 157. SAUNDERS, supra note 6, at 188. 
 158. In addition, because the Supreme Court Justices are appointed for life, they “never need 
respond to the electorate or any specific constituency.”  Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, 
Jr., Televised Violence: First Amendment Principles and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. REV. 
1123, 1297 (1978). 
 159. Kopel, supra note 10, at 20. 
 160. EMERSON, supra note 7, at 502 (author makes this observation with regard to erotic 
material). 
 161. Ross, supra note 98, at 456. 
 162. See supra text accompanying notes 91-96. 
 163. See supra text accompanying note 18 (the purpose “to prevent assigning liability to 
speakers for their expression”).  For instance, if a famous painting happened to motivate someone 
to rape a woman, it seems ridiculous to hold the painter, who had no such intention, responsible. 
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Amendment.”164  This statement, made by the Supreme Court in Ferber, 
makes clear that the Court recognizes the importance of protecting the welfare 
of children.  However, it is important to point out that the Court was 
specifically referring to the potential injury to children in the production of 
pornography.  It is difficult to compare this with violent media forms.  For 
example, child actors can be harmed in the production of a movie with a 
violent war scene.165  Yet, most of the time stunt actors or special graphic 
effects are probably used, and the potential harm to the child actor is very 
limited.  Any constitutional exception limited to only children on violent 
movie sets would be too narrow to rectify the harm it seeks to redress. 
Any control of media violence would have to work within the limits of the 
First Amendment.166  “If depictions or descriptions of violence were within an 
exception to the First Amendment, violent material could be banned or 
controlled without meeting strict scrutiny.”167  However, “[w]hen the harm of 
speech is great enough and its value is small enough, the Court should be 
willing to carve out a new exception.”168  Protecting children from the harm of 
media violence is a strong incentive.  However, it does not outweigh the value 
of allowing expression through speech.169  Further restrictions on speech pose 
a danger to our fundamental freedom of free expression.  Rather, suppression 
of violent entertainment, while to some may be an “advocacy of violation, 
however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech 
where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate 
that the advocacy would be immediately acted on.”170  In addition, a First 
Amendment exception is not necessarily the most effective remedy. 
As Free Speech Coalition points out, the goal of protecting children from 
potential harm is not sufficient for denying speech protection under the First 
Amendment.171  Instead, the Court noted that it must be examined whether 
there are less restrictive means available.  If there are, then these means should 
instead be applied over speech restrictions.  Thus, even if the child 
pornography exception was analogous to making a special exception for 
 
 164. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982). 
 165. One author notes the possible negative implications if regulation of harm were to extend 
too far: “[A]ction films could be banned because of the danger to stuntpeople, westerns 
suppressed because of the danger to animals, and any movie with child actors censored because 
of the documented exploitation of juveniles in the film industry.”  WEINSTEIN, supra note 153, at 
165. 
 166. SAUNDERS, supra note 6, at 58. 
 167. Id. at 59. 
 168. VOLOKH, supra note 23, at 169. 
 169. Especially since, as previously noted in supra notes 3-4, this harm is still debatable. 
 170. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 171. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 252-53 (2002). 
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violence with regard to children, there are arguably many less restrictive means 
still available. 
In determining what is the best solution to the current social problems of 
minors and violence, one must “identify the harms . . . and then judge how 
effective the proposed restriction would be in eliminating these harms.”172  
Any First Amendment restrictions would be the wrong restriction and 
ineffective in eliminating these harms.  Instead, it would “permit restrictions 
that would impair basic free speech values.”173  Also, “the problem of drafting 
regulations that will be effective for children and not interfere with adults is 
almost insuperable.”174  Moreover, this path of resolution includes a high 
possibility of misapplication, restricting more speech than necessary.175 
However, in lieu of creating an expanded or new exception for violence, 
there are several alternatives to a First Amendment exception that are 
available.  These efforts could focus on changing “the conditions that make the 
children so vulnerable and dangerous in the first place.”176  These include self-
regulation and parental controls.  “The fact that the First Amendment does not 
allow the government to compel the media to act responsibly does not, 
however, preclude the media from choosing to act responsibly.”177  For 
instance, “the coin-operated video game industry has implemented an intricate 
system of self-regulation for games placed in arcades and other establishments 
based largely on the type of video game and the content of the message that the 
game conveys.”178  Other examples of self-regulation in the media industry are 
MPAA ratings board for movies, V-Chip television ratings, parental advisory 
labels on music, and Electronic Software Ratings Board for video games.179  
 
 172. WEINSTEIN, supra note 153, at 125. 
 173. Id. at 126. 
 174. EMERSON, supra note 7, at 502. 
 175. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 153, at 142-43. 
 176. Kopel, supra note 10, at 18. 
 177. Id. at 20. 
 178. Pyle, supra note 70, at 464. 
 179. Caron, supra note 1, at 93.  See this article for a short discussion on the effectiveness of 
media self-regulation. 
The most dramatic evidence of the failure of the entertainment media to self-regulate is 
the recent Federal Trade Commission report dealing with the marketing of violent 
entertainment to children.  The report highlights results showing that entertainment 
companies have taken steps to alert concerned parties about explicit content to help 
parents shelter their children from exposure to questionable content.  Regardless of the 
fact that the companies themselves declare the material inappropriate for young viewers, 
they directly target that group in the marketing and advertising efforts. 
Id. at 94 (citations omitted).  See also Timothy D. Casey & Jeff Magenau, A Hybrid Model of 
Self-Regulation and Governmental Regulation of Electronic Commerce, 19 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 (2002); Angela J. Campbell, Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 
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So far, self-regulation has not been entirely successful.  However, that does not 
mean that it is an ineffective resolution.  As the FTC’s own reports indicate, 
there is evidence that over time the self-regulatory systems are becoming more 
effective.180  Another alternative is the “inclusion of media literacy courses in 
school systems.”181 
It is also possible that a new exception denying media violence First 
Amendment protection would cause a slide down a slippery slope.  Any 
definition of violence would have to be very specific so as not to be overbroad.  
While some things portray violence, such as news programs about war and 
television shows like Law & Order, they “have many positive attributes.”182  
Many people who are adamantly opposed to any remedy that would threaten 
the First Amendment protection of free speech note that media violence can 
also be “plentifully found in Shakespeare, Homer, and the Bible as readily as 
in Bruce Willis movies or Bugs Bunny cartoons.”183  Further, “as long as 
material is available to adults it is hopeless to try and keep it out of the hands 
of adolescents.”184  Thus, a resolution that censors speech may not even solve 
the problems it seeks to redress. 
Where further restrictions on an individual’s, even youth’s, freedom of 
speech are permitted, there is an eating away of the core of the First 
Amendment’s purpose: 
[A] regulation of otherwise protected speech on the ground that it may 
stimulate improper thoughts or be used as an instrument of crime in the hands 
of deviant persons, absent compelling evidence of a causal link to actual harm, 
is a dangerous incursion on the First Amendment, an invitation to censorship, 
 
FED. COMM. L.J. 711 (1999); Kevin W. Saunders, Media Self-Regulation of Depictions of 
Violence: A Last Opportunity, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 445 (1994). 
 180. See infra text accompanying notes 104-13. 
 181. Murray, supra note 16, at 12. 
 182. Caron, supra note 1, at 99. As noted earlier, there are many who argue that there are 
positive effects media violence has on youth.  “[M]edia violence has an important role in 
satisfying some young people’s needs for fantasy role-playing, empowerment, and temporary 
escape from troubles and anxieties.”  Heins, supra note 3, at 422.  They contend that society 
needs to “abandon the popular political sport of ‘blaming the media.’”  Id.  Instead, other 
possibilities to be examined are the “easy availability of guns, . . . provid[ing] impoverished 
public schools with better facilities, or creat[ing] job training programs in urban areas still 
recovering from economic restructuring.” Karen Sternheimer, Blaming Television and Movies Is 
Easy and Wrong, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2001, at M5. 
 183. Heins, supra note 3, at 421.  An example of proposed regulations that may have gone too 
far is a 2000 Harvard School of Public Health recommendation that the Motion Picture 
Association of America regulations include Bambi, Aladdin, and The Lion King as having too 
much violence for minors.  MARJORIE HEINS, NOT IN FRONT OF THE CHILDREN 257 (2001). 
 184. EMERSON, supra note 7, at 502. 
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and a return to an approach, long ago discarded as unconstitutional by the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 185 
The recently decided case Free Speech Coalition “stands for the proposition 
that attempting to control evil conduct by banning evil thoughts is 
fundamentally antithetical to the concept of free speech.” 186 
I do not contend that violence in the media does not have any negative 
effects on children.  However, other alternatives besides a constitutional 
exception can help alleviate the harm done to children as a result of media 
violence without censorship.  “Parents play key roles in their children’s lives, 
and are one of the best means of combating violence in the media.”187  It is 
important that the State does not try to replace the role of the parent.  The 
Court has recognized that “parents have a constitutionally protected right to 
raise their children free from unwarranted interference by the State.”188  This is 
just one avenue for addressing the problem of violence in an effort to really 
attain a solution, instead of just putting a Band-Aid over the problem. 
Justice Holmes’ “marketplace of ideas” concept, articulated in Abrams v. 
United States, recognizes that “in a truly open marketplace of ideas the truth 
will ultimately prevail.”189  As stated by the Supreme Court, “it is a central 
tenet of the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the 
marketplace of ideas.”190  The Fifth Circuit has observed that 
[t]he constitutional protection accorded to the freedom of speech and of the 
press is not based on the naive belief that speech can do no harm but on the 
confidence that the benefits society reaps from the free flow and exchange of 
ideas outweigh the costs society endures by receiving reprehensible or 
dangerous ideas.191 
Instead of censorship, a possible “proper response to offensive speech is not to 
prohibit it, but to combat it with counterspeech.”192  If censorship is allowed to 
persist in response to society’s concerns, then “much of the nation’s 
 
 185. Bloom, supra note 12, at 20. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Caron, supra note 1, at 95.  Another author points out that “solving the violence 
problem, which is partly derivative of the literacy problem, cannot be accomplished without 
strong families.”  Kopel, supra note 10, at 19. 
 188. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1972); Krattenmaker, supra note 158, at 
1241. 
 189. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); ZELEZNY, 
supra note 24, at 33. 
 190. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (quoting F.C.C. v. Pacifica 
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978)). 
 191. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1019 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 192. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Okianer Christian Dark, Violence and 
the Mass Media: Lessons Learned from the Battle Over “Words that Wound,” 4 KAN. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 25, 28 (1995). 
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communication system will reflect only the views of a small privileged 
minority.”193  Further, every time society has a concern, it will solve the 
problem by suppressing speech.  Instead, “[o]nly by staunchly defending every 
person’s right to public speech does our society guarantee that the best ideas 
will continue to enter and prevail in the public arena.”194 
One must recognize that “concerns about media violence also have more to 
do with socializing youth than with objective proof of psychological harm.”195  
There are several adverse reasons for not censoring violence with regard to 
minors: 
The ponderous, humorless overliteralism of so much censorship directed at 
youth not only takes the fun, ambiguity, cathartic function, and irony out of the 
world of imagination and creativity; it reduces the difficult, complicated, 
joyous, and sometimes tortured experience of growing up to a sanitized 
combination of adult moralizing and intellectual closed doors.196 
Of course, this does not mean the problems facing minors due to media 
violence should be disregarded all together.  But limiting minors’ access to 
violent speech through the First Amendment is not the best response.  “We 
cannot restore a ‘lost innocence’ that may never have existed, but we can offer 
perspectives from our experience and help interpreting the world, flaws and 
all.”197  Instead of the censorship route to remedy the problem of minors and 
media violence, “policymakers [should] focus on affirmative, productive ways 
of improving the upbringing of youth and inculcating good values (including 
alternatives to violence).”198  This will continue to respect the purpose of the 
First Amendment while also helping to alleviate the problems caused  by 
violence in the media with regard to children. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that there is growing concern over the impact of violence 
in the media on children.  Finding violence’s place within the First 
Amendment is a dangerous task.  In one direction, it could result in 
unnecessary censorship.  In another, it could expand First Amendment 
protection beyond that intended by the Framers.  When regulations on violence 
 
 193. FARBER, supra note 13, 216. 
 194. Matthew G. T. Martin, True Threats, Militant Activists, and the First Amendment, 82 
N.C. L. REV. 280, 324-25 (2003). 
 195. HEINS, supra note 183, at 255. 
 196. Id. at 256. 
 197. Views on the News from the Executive Director, CENSORSHIP NEWS ONLINE, Spring 
1998, at www.ncac.org/cen_news/cn69views.html. 
 198. Heins, supra note 3, at 421.  The same article lists sample “affirmative approaches” as 
“media literacy education, funding of independent, noncorporate media, and hands-on experience 
in youth arts and journalism programs.”  Id. 
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are limited to minors the task becomes somewhat less questionable.  Any 
restriction on violence could not include news of war or other materials that 
will benefit children’s educational and maturing experience.  But there are 
some things that may simply not be in children’s best interest, and some 
remedy may be appropriate. 
However, because violence does not comport itself well into any current 
exception and would create many difficulties in its own exception, the 
potential injuries to freedom of speech are too grand for a true violence for 
minors exception to First Amendment protection.  Restrictions through 
legislation have failed to meet the requirements of the First Amendment.  
Violence portrayed through media with respect to minors should instead be 
controlled through alternative means such as self-regulation and parental 
control.  Any creation of a new or expanded exception to the First Amendment 
will promote a dilution of the constitutional guarantee of free speech.  This 
step would be much more dangerous to society than any harm caused by 
minors’ exposure to violence. 
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